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As the international situation continued to deteriorate during the summer of 1939, the 
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had to think 
seriously about how it would fight a war against 
Germany. Since the threat to Canada from 
German bombers was relatively low, the air force 
came to realize that the principal responsibility 
for its organization on the east coast, Eastern 
Air Command, would be maritime defence and 
that this required intimate cooperation with 
the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).1  Realizing 
just how important the assistance given to the 
navy was, the Air Officer Commanding Eastern 
Air Command, Group Captain N.R. Anderson, 
stressed that it was absolutely vital that Eastern 
Air Command’s Maritime Patrol Squadrons do 
an adequate job of assisting the navy by providing 
air coverage for convoys. “Otherwise,” he warned, 
“through lack of the necessary cooperation an 
attempt may be made by the Navy at some future 
date to develop their own Air Arm as had been 
done in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A.”2 
Indeed, military aviation for use over the sea 
had seen a different development in Canada 
than it did in Britain or the United States. These 
latter countries had developed both maritime 
air forces, that is, aircraft under the command 
of the country’s respective air forces, as well as 
naval air services, which are aircraft under the 
command of the navy and which operate largely 
from aircraft carriers. 
In Canada, though, the development of military 
aviation was focused on the growth of a maritime 
air force only. Although the last few days of the 
First World War had seen the creation of the 
navy’s Royal Canadian Naval Air Service, the 
war ended before its aircraft could be put into 
operation on the east coast, and this naval air 
element was soon lost in the budget cuts of the 
immediate post-war Canadian Government.3  
Instead, responsibility for air coverage over water 
in Canada fell to the Canadian Air Force, which 
later became the Royal Canadian Air Force. As 
a result, by late 1939, maritime air duties on 
Canada’s east coast fell to the Royal Canadian 
Air Force’s Eastern Air Command.
During the war, the Germans operated their 
submarines, known as U-boats, at night and in 
groups called “wolf packs” against Allied convoys, 
and they did so with much success.4  As shipping 
losses continued to rise throughout 1941 and 
1942, the Western Allies began to explore options 
on how to stem German U-boat attacks. They 
all agreed on the need for more air coverage for 
convoys. Aircraft were one of the key weapons 
employed by the Allies in the war against the 
U-boats. Indeed, a U-boat could not surface in 
the presence of an enemy aircraft for fear of it 
either alerting nearby naval vessels to its presence 
or being attacked with air-launched weapons.5  
Air coverage for the defence of convoys could 
either be in the form of shore-based aircraft, 
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6commanded by the air force, or aircraft from 
naval vessels in the form of small escort carriers. 
These vessels were merchant ships fitted with 
a flight deck and re-commissioned as auxiliary 
aircraft carriers. They played a multitude of 
roles, of which perhaps the most important was 
to accompany Allied convoys on their voyages 
across the North Atlantic.
Escort carriers could stay with the convoy at all 
times and provide immediate air coverage for a 
great span of time. The air force’s shore-based 
aircraft did not share this advantage due to their 
need to travel between their base and the convoy. 
This meant a limited number of hours when they 
could operate around a convoy. The inclusion of 
escort carriers in a convoy also allowed Western 
Approaches Command in Britain to route 
shipping directly, thereby shortening the voyage, 
instead of having it go out of its way to seek the 
safety of shore-based air cover. 
Escort carriers also had their disadvantages. 
Navigational difficulties encountered by ship-
borne aircraft operating in the cruel North 
Atlantic risked “the possibility of high losses 
through pilots being unable to return to their 
ships.” Other drawbacks included the high cost 
of maintaining carriers and their vulnerability to 
submarine attack thereby requiring additional 
ships tasked specifically to protect the carrier 
instead of conducting anti-submarine duties.6  
Indeed, such vulnerability was made all the 
more apparent by the short wartime career of 
the first escort carrier, HMS Audacity. This 
Royal Navy vessel commenced operations in the 
defence of convoys in the autumn of 1941. Almost 
immediately she demonstrated her value in the 
defence of shipping. While providing protection 
for a convoy to Gibraltar, Audacity’s aircraft 
fought off German aircraft and also reported and 
attacked four U-boats that had been shadowing 
the convoy.7  Nonetheless, as a vessel operating 
with a convoy, Audacity was also a ripe target 
for the German submarines, and she was 
subsequently sunk by a U-boat only a couple of 
days after she had so effectively driven off the first 
attack of German submarines.8  It was with these 
issues in mind that the idea for a Royal Canadian 
Navy air arm developed.
 One of the first individuals to spur serious 
thinking on the establishment of an RCN Air 
Arm to man escort carriers for convoy defence 
was Commander C. Thompson of the Royal 
Navy. In September 1942, Thompson, who 
was the captain of the escort destroyer HMS 
Witherington, circulated a very critical report on 
air coverage provided by Eastern Air Command. 
Stating that the current efforts by the RCAF 
organization left “much to be desired,” Thompson 
argued that “experience during this war fully 
confirms that air operations over the sea are 
far more efficiently carried out by Naval Officers 
who have received air training than by Air Force 
Officers who are posted for duty in naval co-
operation squadrons.”9  One of Thompson’s main 
HMS Audacity, a Royal Navy escort carrier, proved the value of such a ship in defending
convoys. However, the vessel also displayed the vulnerability of such a high-value target.
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7recommendations was that in order for maritime 
air operations in Canada to be successful, “there 
needs to be naval influence from top to bottom.” 
He stressed that it simply was not enough for the 
Navy to have operational control or direction at 
the operational headquarters level because it did 
not ensure competency at the tactical level, and 
he therefore suggested that “there must be Naval 
Officers in the aircraft.”10  
 What Thompson did not appreciate was 
that having Naval observers in aircraft would 
have a limited effect on the efficiency of Eastern 
Right: As Air Officer Commanding the RCAF’s Eastern Air 
Command in 1939, Group Captain N.R. Anderson (seen 
here as an Air Commodore later in the war) warned his 
superiors about the possibility of a navy attempt to wrestle 
responsibility for convoy air defence from the RCAF if the 
air force did not carry out this role efficiently.
Below: The Air Gap, also known as the “Black Pit,” 
consisted of a giant hole in the air cover over the main trade 
routes between Britain and North America that stretched 
300 miles across from east to west and 600 miles north to 
south from Greenland and the Azores Islands. It was here 
where U-boats conducted their surface operations against 
convoys without fear of aerial attack.
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8Air Command operations. At this point in time, 
command of the aircraft was vested entirely in 
the pilot with the result that the observer, who 
was often more capable of making a correct 
tactical decision, was left without any executive 
responsibility.11  Thompson’s ideal solution was 
that a Royal Canadian Navy Air Service be created 
to fulfill the role of providing air coverage for 
convoys. He did, however, concede that it was 
not desirable that the navy should completely 
take over the RCAF’s maritime patrol squadrons 
for the time being. “After all,” he noted, “we are 
aiming at co-operation between the Services, and 
this [taking over the air force’s squadrons] will 
take it to the extreme.”12  
 Thompson’s report met with much resentment 
from both the RCAF and members from the 
staff of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) maritime air 
organization, Coastal Command. Commander 
P.B. Martineau, who was a Royal Navy (RN) officer 
on the staff of Coastal Command, was dismayed 
with Thompson’s suggestions, and stated that “he 
was dead against the report.”13  The Air Officer 
Commanding Eastern Air Command, by now Air 
Vice-Marshal A.A.L. Cuffe, went further, stressing 
that “as far as control of the air force’s Anti-
Submarine operations is concerned, this seems 
to be purely a matter of close cooperation – so 
long as that cooperation works smoothly, is there 
any need for complete naval control?”14  Thus, 
With additional fuel tanks for added endurance, Very-Long-Range Liberators were the best Maritime
Patrol aircraft utilized by the RAF and RCAF for convoy air coverage in the Mid-Atlantic.
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9at a joint meeting between air force and naval 
officers at Eastern Air Command Headquarters 
in Halifax, it was not surprising that the attendees 
decided against implementing Thompson’s 
version of increased naval command and control 
over and input into the air force’s maritime air 
operations.15 
 The RCN did, however, take Thompson’s 
recommendation for a Naval Air Arm to heart, as 
several officers in Naval Service Headquarters had 
for a while been desiring to secure an air element 
for their service. One of the main problems of 
the air force’s Eastern Air Command was that 
it did not have aircraft with sufficient range to 
patrol long distances effectively. The result of 
this dilemma was that an “Air Gap” existed in the 
mid-Atlantic, where U-boats operated free from 
fear of Allied aircraft. Although the air force tried 
to close the Air Gap by securing Very-Long-Range 
B-24 Liberator aircraft, the navy sought to solve 
the problem by securing aircraft carriers for its 
mid-ocean escort groups. The problem was that 
the navy had virtually no officers with experience 
in carrier operations – only two regular force 
officers had any carrier experience, and neither 
had dealt with air operations.16  Consequently, 
in April 1943, the Naval Staff tasked the navy’s 
Director of Operations Division, Acting Captain 
Horatio Nelson Lay, to go on a fact-finding tour 
in the United States and Britain to examine the 
elements required for and the possibility of the 
RCN securing its own Air Arm.17  
 Shortly thereafter, on 13 May 1943, the Chief 
of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Percy W. Nelles, 
raised the question of establishing an Air Arm 
at a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee. This 
immediately drew a guarded response from the 
Minister of National Defence for Air, Charles G. 
“Chubby” Power. The minister, protective of the 
air force’s jurisdiction over air matters, “observed 
that a very important question of policy was 
involved.” He feared that the creation of such a 
new Naval Air Arm would be a drain on the already 
strained British Commonwealth Air Training 
Plan resources, and that it “would mean two 
separate air forces in Canada, with consequent 
duplication organizations for headquarters, 
supply, repairs, and the rest.” Furthermore, 
Power stressed such duplication would also be 
“more costly in terms of manpower, money and 
materials than development within the RCAF to 
meet limited Canadian Naval requirements.”18 
 Echoing Power’s concern over the financial 
implications, the Minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsley, 
argued against the duplication that separate 
air forces for each service would entail. Isley 
instead advocated for the continuation of the 
current system of the “provision of air protection 
of convoys by co-operation between the navy 
and air force.” Finally, the Minister of National 
Defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston “expressed doubt 
as to whether Canada should assume any further 
commitments which made further calls upon 
Canadian manpower.” The result was that the 
An RAF Coastal Command VLR Liberator.
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10
Cabinet War Committee deferred decision on the 
issue until Lay had completed his report.19  
 The RCAF was not alone in being concerned 
about the command and control implications of 
a Naval Air Arm. The RCN itself, understanding 
that “in the final analysis it is the RCAF that have 
the say in all matters affecting the air,” feared 
that the air force would both “do all in its power 
to prevent the division of air authority” and 
attempt to dictate “the operation of the aircraft, 
the supply of personnel, the maintenance of 
the aircraft, supply of aircraft and all the other 
factors involved.” At the strategic level, the navy, 
understanding that the importance of the escort 
carrier operating in convoy escort groups was 
growing, feared that if Canada did not secure 
carriers, it would mean “a gradual decline both 
in the RCN’s strength as an escort service and in 
the strength of its strategic control and relations 
with the Navies of the UK and the US.”20  The 
navy memo continued on, stressing that “only 
can actual experience in the operations of such 
vessels entitle a Naval Service to voice an opinion 
on their operations.”21  Indeed, the RCN hoped 
that Captain Lay’s report would put to rest some 
of their anxieties.
 Lay submitted this long-awaited report on 
27 August 1943. His first recommendation 
was that “a Royal Canadian Naval Air Service 
(RCNAS) be established as soon as possible.” 
Lay also recommended that “the RCNAS should 
be manned by Naval personnel and under the 
direct administrative and operational control of 
the RCN.”22  This recommendation was based on 
Lay’s lack of faith in the concept of co-operation. 
He argued that “co-operation between the two 
services cannot be as efficient as single control 
by one service” and he gave the example of the 
years of inter-service infighting between Britain’s 
Royal Air Force and Royal Navy over the control 
of the Fleet Air Arm in the interwar period 
as a reason for complete naval control over a 
Canadian Naval Air Service.23  On the other hand, 
Lay also recommended that “the Naval Air Service 
should concern itself with carrier operations 
only” and not with maritime air operations. Such 
operations, he stressed, should remain with the 
RCAF. Lay’s reasoning for this contention was his 
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In 1943, Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa tasked Acting Captain Horatio Nelson Lay (seen here, middle, in 1940 
as a Lieutenant-Commander with fellow RCN officers H.G. DeWolf and J.C.H. Hibbard) to travel to Britain and the United 
States on a fact-finding tour to examine the possibilities of the RCN having its own Air Arm.
C
FP
U
 F
-2
09
0,
 c
ou
rte
sy
 o
f t
he
 S
he
ar
w
at
er
 A
vi
at
io
n 
M
us
eu
m
C
ou
rte
sy
 o
f t
he
 S
he
ar
w
at
er
 A
vi
at
io
n 
M
us
eu
m
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol13/iss3/2
11
Above: Captain Horatio Nelson Lay would later go on to command the Royal Navy escort carrier HMS Nabob, which 
was largely manned by Canadians except for the flight personnel, who were British.  While conducting operations off in 
the Barents Sea in August 1944, Nabob was heavily damaged by a torpedo from the German submarine U-354.
Below: HMCS Warrior, the RCN’s first light fleet aircraft carrier, was commissioned into the navy shortly after the war. 
She carried Seafire and Firefly aircraft from the RCN’s 803 and 825 Squadrons.
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well-founded belief that “in Canada the RCAF is 
well established in Coastal operations and it is 
considered that it would be more efficient not to 
disturb this organization.”24 
 Because Lay’s report contained no air force 
input, the Cabinet War Committee deferred 
making a decision on it until a joint air force-
navy Committee had examined the issue.  
After some heated discussions between 
RCAF and RCN members of this 
joint service committee,25 the body 
finally submitted its report on the 
12th of October 1943. It echoed Lay’s 
findings by calling for the creation of 
a Naval Air Service to be commanded 
by the navy and by confirming that 
shore-based aircraft should remain 
under the command of the air 
force.26 
 Former  Canadian 
naval aviator Stewart 
Soward has questioned 
this arrangement over 
maritime air assets. 
He called it “highly 
dubious” and noted 
that “it is remarkable 
that no explanation 
was ever given to 
justify the decision.”27 
Such a contention, 
however, overlooks the 
part of Lay’s report 
that explained that it 
would not be efficient 
to disturb the current 
organization of the RCAF’s 
Eastern Air Command. In 
short, the navy did not favour the 
transfer of Eastern Air Command’s Maritime 
Patrol squadrons to the Naval Air Service because 
it understood that to make wholesale changes in 
the middle of a very important campaign against 
a deadly enemy risked an administrative chaos 
that could potentially cost them final victory 
in the Battle of the Atlantic. This was a sound 
decision that was in fact made on precedent. In 
late 1940, Britain’s Royal Navy had attempted 
to secure command over the Royal Air Force’s 
maritime air organization, Coastal Command. 
However, the British War Cabinet blocked the 
navy’s efforts, concluding that to undergo such 
changes in the middle of a war would not be a 
sound decision.28  It is therefore not surprising 
that the Royal Canadian Navy did not secure 
command over the air force’s maritime air 
squadrons along with a naval air arm in 1943.
 In the end, the RCN was able to form its 
own air arm, but it was not until shortly after 
the conclusion of the war that resources 
allowed it to operate aircraft from its 
new light fleet carrier, HMCS Warrior. 
During the war, the air force could 
have attempted to put up greater 
resistance in what it might have 
viewed as an attempt by the navy to 
intrude into air force jurisdiction 
over military aviation. However, in 
the end the two Canadian services 
were able to come up with a 
solution that satisfied both 
parties: an air arm for the 
RCN and the continued 
operation of Maritime 
Patrol squadrons by the 
RCAF.
Notes
This article is based on a 
presentation given at the 
Laurier Centre for Military 
Strategic and Disarmament 
Studies’ 14th Military History 
Colloquium in May 2003. The 
author wishes to thank Dr. Mike 
Whitby and the rest of the staff at 
the Department of National Defence’s 
Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa 
for all of their assistance.
1. W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: 
The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force 
Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the 
Department of National Defence, 1986), p.378.
2. Anderson to Breadner, 23 August 1939, Directorate of 
History and Heritage [hereafter DHH], Department of 
National Defence file 181.009 (D4979).
3. See Michael L. Hadley and Roger Sarty, Tin-Pots and 
Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German 
Sea Raiders, 1880-1918 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1991), p.280 and S.F. Wise, Canadian 
Airmen and the First World War: The Official History 
of the Royal Canadian Air Force Volume I (Tornto: 
University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the 
Department of National Defence and the Canadian 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol13/iss3/2
13
Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services 
Canada, 1980), pp.602-608.
4. For the development of U-boat “wolf pack” tactics, see 
Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and 
Twenty Days, R.H. Stevens, transl. (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1997), Chapter 18.
5. John Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence, 1919-1945: 
Constant Endeavour, (Keele, U.K.: Ryburn Publishing, 
Keele University Press, 1995), pp.123-124.
6. Horatio Nelson Lay, Memoirs of a Mariner, p.149; 
William Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western 
Approaches: a biography of Admiral Sir Max Horton 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954); Report by 
Professor P.M.S. Blackett, “The Value of Escort Vessels 
and Aircraft in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” 11 January 
1943, [British] Cabinet Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Committee, Public Records Office [hereafter PRO], 
London, Cabinet File [heafter CAB] 86/3; Memorandum 
by G/C Costello, Senior Air Staff Officer, 14 September 
1942, National Archives of Canada [herafter NAC], 
Record Group [hereafter RG] 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, 
Part 1. 
7. Bernard Fitzsimons, ed., Warships of the Second World 
War (Anstey, U.K.: Marshall Cavendish USA Ltd., 1973), 
p.6. The convoy’s naval escorts eventually finished off 
some of the attacking U-boats.
8. The Battle of the Atlantic: The Official Account of the 
Fight Against The U-boats 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 
1946), pp.37-38.
9. Commander C. Thompson, RN, “The Necessity for Naval 
Pilots and Observers in the Royal Canadian Air Force 
Squadrons Employed in Naval Co-Operation Duties,” 25 
September 1942, PRO, Air Ministry File [hereafter Air] 
15/217.
10. Ibid. According to RCN Captain Horatio Nelson Lay, 
Thompson had “considerable experience in the Royal 
Navy, as a Staff Officer in the Mediterranean Fleet 
during all the important carrier actions, and as an 
Escort Commander in the Western Local Escort Force.” 
Memorandum to VCNS, CNS, and Minister of National 
Defence for Naval Services from Acting Captain Horatio 
Nelson Lay, 11 January 1943, NAC RG 24, Vol. 83-
84/167, Box 575, file 1700-913, Part 1.
11. DHH 79/599, D.V. Peyton-Ward, The RAF in the Maritime 
War, Volume I: The Atlantic and Home Waters: The 
Prelude, April 1918-September 1939 (RAF Air Historical 
Branch Narrative), nd, p.196.
12. Commander C. Thompson, RN, “The Necessity for Naval 
Pilots and Observers in the Royal Canadian Air Force 
Squadrons Employed in Naval Co-Operation Duties,” 
25 September 1942, Air 15/217.
13. Report by Commander P.B. Martineau, RN, on Visit to 
Eastern Air Command, 31 October 1942, Air 15/217.
14. Minute by Cuffe in the margin of Thompson’s report, 
nd, DHH 79/184. Emphasis in original.
15. Cuffe to Minister of National Defence for Air, C.G. Power, 
20 November 1942, DHH 79/184.
16. Memorandum to VCNS, CNS, and Minister of National 
Defence for Naval Services from Acting Captain Horatio 
Nelson Lay, 11 January 1943, NAC RG 24, Vol. 83-
84/167, Box 575, file 1700-913, Part 1.
17. J.D.F. Kealy and E.C. Russel, A History of Canadian 
Naval Aviation, 1918-1962 (Ottawa: The Naval 
Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters, 
Department of National Defence, 1965), p.22. See also 
Michael Shawn Cafferky, “Towards the Balanced Fleet: A 
History of the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service, 1943-
1945,” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 
1987.
18. Minutes of the 235th Meeting of the Cabinet War 
Committee, NAC RG 2, 7c, Vol. 12, microfilm reel 
C-4875.
19. Ibid.
20. “Aircraft Carriers as Part of [the] RCN,” Memorandum 
Prepared by Lieutenant-Commander J.S. Stead, Senior 
Officer (Air), 4 May 1943, NAC RG 24, Vol. 83-84/167, 
Box 575, file 1700-913, Part 1.
21. Ibid. Emphasis added.
22. Report on the Formation of a Royal Canadian Naval Air 
Service With Covering Submission by A/Captain H.N. 
Lay, RCN, 27 August 1943, p. 32, NAC RG 24, Vol. 83-
84/167, Box 575, file 1700-913, Part 1.
23. Ibid., 17; See also DHH 79/599, Peyton-Ward, I, The 
RAF in the Maritime War, Volume 1, pp.141-150 & 199-
205, and Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the 
Wars, Volume II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 
1930-1939 (London: Collins, 1976), pp.401-413 for 
information on the “Inskip Inquiry,” which led to the 
eventual placement of the Fleet Air Arm under the full 
command of the Admiralty.
24. Report on the Formation of a Royal Canadian Naval Air 
Service With Covering Submission by A/Captain H.N. 
Lay, RCN, 27 August 1943, pp. 32-33, NAC RG 24, Vol. 
83-84/167, Box 575, file 1700-913, Part 1.
25. Cafferky, “Towards a Balanced Fleet,” p.118. See also 
Lay, Memoirs of a Mariner.
26. Cabinet War Committee Document No. 633, “Joint Royal 
Canadian Navy-Royal Canadian Air Force Committee on 
the Acquisition and Operation of Aircraft Carriers by the 
Royal Canadian Navy (Report by Special Committee),” 
12 October 1943 and Minutes of the 265th Meeting of 
the Cabinet War Committee, 21 October 1943, NAC RG 
2, 7c, Volume 14, microfilm reel C-4875.
27. Stewart Soward, “Canadian Naval Aviation, 1915-69,” in 
James A. Boutlilier, ed., RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 
(Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 
1982), pp.273-274.
28. See Richard Evan Goette, “The Struggle for a Joint 
Command and Control System in the Northwest Atlantic 
Theatre of Operations: A Study of the RCAF and RCN 
Trade Defence Efforts During the Battle of the Atlantic,” 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen’s University, 2002), 
Chapter 3.
Richard Goette is currently a doctoral 
candidate in the Department of History at 
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. His 
dissertation will explore continental defence 
command and control issues between Canada 
and the United States during the Cold War.
9
: The RCAF and the Creation of an RCN Air Arm: A Study of the Command and Control of Maritime Air Assets
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2004
